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Executive Summary 
The Uruguay Round differs from past Rounds in its recognition that 
trade problems have their roots in a wide range of domestic as well as trade 
policy instruments.  This recognition signaled the need for a  measurement 
device that would tell us considerably more about government intervention in 
agriculture than we learn from tariffs or simple nominal protection 
coefficients, but that would require considerably less information than that 
needed by many economic models.  Extensive work at the DECD  on producer 
subsidy equivalents (PSEs) encouraged negotiators to fmd a formal role in 
the negotiations for an aggregate index of this type.  Criticisms of the PSE 
(as we know it) produced suggestions that there might be some other 
aggregate measure of support (AMS)  more suitable to be cast as an 
instrument of negotiation.  As the Round has progressed, there has been very 
little disagreement over the need for some AMS,  but relatively little 
agreement over what its explicit role or key characteristics should be. 
Indeed, different roles may well call for  different characteristics. 
The use of an AMS  as a negotiating device suggests a package 
approach to policy reform or, at a minimum, an interest on the part of 
negotiators in the full range of policy instruments affecting agricultural 
markets.  This is a marked addition to past practice and complements the 
traditional request and offer approach and efforts to write rules strictly 
regulating particular policy instruments.  The AMS  approach offers the 
possibility of broad based, across-the-board policy reform that avoids 
misinformation and special interest group domination and, at the same time, 
offers countries flexibility in their choice of approaches to reform.  (Flexibility 
is greater the larger the policy set included in the AMS).  The strength of an 
AMS  approach is its flexibility.  Its greatest potential weaknesses are (1) 
particularly egregious policy instruments may remain in place and (2)  policy 
switching could, in theory, produce greater trade disruptions than those we 
currently face.  Additionally, a range of technical problems must be 
confronted before the AMS  approach can be made operational. 
Broadly, what are the possible roles for an AMS?  Monitoring is at one 
end of a  spectrum of possible roles for the AMS.  A monitoring role means 
that an AMS  is used to keep track of how countries are doing in meeting 
commitments that may have been made through any number of negotiating 
approaches, or merely to keep watch on the agricultural policy picture in 
relation to trends and events in world markets.  Disciplines might be 
imposed on countries not meeting commitments, as indicated by the AMS, 
but these would be external to the AMS  itself. 
i At the opposite end of the spectrum of possible roles is the AMS  as a 
legally-bound instrument of negotiation.  In this role, the AMS  takes the part 
of a tariff schedule for agriculture.  With no other accompanying restrictions 
on policy instruments, this role gives countries flexibility in choosing policy 
instruments.  Accompanying rules, for example on policy switching, could be 
necessary to assure that AMS  reductions coincide with reductions in trade 
distortions. 
Intermediate roles include the AMS ,as a  "triggering" or "crediting" 
device.  Triggering suggests a more formal role for the AMS  in the 
monitoring process, whereby parties would be bound to take some prescribed 
action signaled by a predesignated change in the AMS.  The AMS  is used in 
this way in the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement.  The AMS  could also be 
used to quantify "credits" or "debits" extended to countries for policy changes 
made since the negotiations began or since some negotiated base period. 
AMS  Measures.  The first of the AMS  measures proposed for  GATT 
use in the Producer Subsidy Equivalent (PSE) as used in the Trade Mandate 
Study by the DECD.  The PSE is defined as the payment needed to 
compensate farm producers for the loss of income resulting from removal of a 
given policy measure.  The other two proposed measures are variations of 
the PSE concept.  The TRade Distortion Equivalent (TDE), as proposed by 
Canada, is a PSE applied only to policy measures agreed to be significantly 
trade distorting, and it would take into account the effect of supply control 
measures.  The Support Measurement Unit (SMU)  as defined by the EC,  like 
the TDE, focuses  on policies that significantly affect farmers' production 
decisions and takes account of the effects of supply control measures.  It 
further adjusts the PSE to remove the effects of exogenous work price and 
currency fluctuations. 
The exact definition of an AMS  should be determined by the use to 
which it is put.  For example: 
ii The PSE or one of its variants has benefited from significant definition 
of calculation methodology, economic assumptions and agreement on concepts. 
The extent of further agreement required on such items for  use of the PSE-
type AMS  is likely to be much less than for use of other measures, such as 
tariff equivalents or effective rates of protection, where agreement on such 
arcane concepts as elasticities and value-added coefficients may be needed. 
Nonetheless a significant set of issues remain to be classified and negotiated 
before a specific AMS  will be acceptable in an operational role. 
How to Make AMSs  Operational.  If  incorporated into GATT rules, 
then a well-functioning AMS  would need to be defmed that balanced the 
tradeoffs between simplicity and accuracy in reflecting the levels and changes 
in support.  Simplicity is needed because with more complex and less clear 
measures, policymakers and observers would have more difficulty linking 
causes (policy changes) with effects (changes in AMS),  thus making the 
measure less useful.  On the other hand, there are more conceptual and 
technical problems associated with defining an AMS.  The tradeoff between 
simplicity and accuracy likely will be difficult to achieve. 
If  an AMS  is to play an important role in GATT  rules, then the most 
important of these concepts and problems must be agreed upon by the 
negotiating parties.  The most important issues include: 
* 
* 
An AMS  can change for  two reasons; (a)  a  change in "specified" 
policies or (b) a change in other policies or market conditions. 
Shall changes in (b) be included in the measure of AMS  or held 
constant?  What are "specified" policies? 
If  the "other policies and market conditions" are to be held 
constant, a key issue is what reference price and base period 




This becomes a critical issue if the objective of the AMS  is to 
measure trade distortion and the role is more than informal 
monitoring. 
Shall governments be allowed to increase any specific policy 
intervention -- Le.,  would policy switching be allowed within a 
negotiated overall AMS  level? 
How should production control be measured? 
All  the technical problems raised above can be solved to some degree 
of satisfaction.  But these technical problems are serious.  The information 
requirements are also substantial.  Meeting the data needs in a timely way 
would be very difficult, even in the industrial countries.  Still, we have some 
evidence that an AMS  has a place in trade negotiations -- the United States 
and Canada included an AMS  in their free trade agreement. 
If  GATT is to use the AMS  concept in some way, institutional 
arrangements would need to be specified -- who would compute AMSs and 
when. 
iv THE AGGREGATE MEASURE OF SUPPORT: 
POTENTIAL USE BY GATT FOR AGRICULTURE! 
In the Mid-Term Review Agreement on Agriculture, reached in Geneva 
in April 1989, GATT Ministers agreed to pursue long-term policy reform through 
"  ... substantial  progressive  reductions  in  agricultural  support  and  protection 
sustained over an agreed period of time".  Reform is to be achieved "  ... through 
negotiations  on  specific  policies  and  measures,  through  the  negotiation  of 
commitments on an aggregate measure of support, the terms of which will be 
negotiated, or through a combination of these approaches".  The Ministers also 
agreed that "  ... credit will be given for  measures implemented since the Punta 
del  Este  Declaration  which  contribute  positively  to  the  reform  programme" 
(GATT,  1989). 
This  paper--one  of three  developed  by  members  of the  International 
Agricultural Trade Research Consortium on the general subject of implementing 
policy  reform  in  the  Uruguay  Round--takes  a  close  look  at  the  use  of  an 
aggregate measure of support (AMS)  in the negotiating context.  It identifies 
and  distinguishes  among  alternative  forms  of the  AMS,  and  it  explores  a 
number of conceptual issues that must be resolved if the AMS is to take on one 
or more  of several possible  roles.  The paper then draws  on  a  number  of 
explicit examples of country policy instruments to discuss measurement issues 
related to supply controls, fixed reference prices, and the granting of credit for 
past policy actions (see references).  The examples highlight the complexities 
underlying the AMS approach, but also suggest its workability if the negotiators 
make the necessary commitments.  The paper also elicits implications from  a 
game theory model of the political economy of U.S.-EC negotiations with respect 
to the value of an AMS  in achieving a negotiating accord. 
Why is there so much interest in an AMS? 
The Uruguay Round differs from past Roun~  in its recognition that trade 
problems have their roots in a  wide range of domestic as well as trade policy 
instruments.  This recognition signalled the need for a measurement device that 
would give us considerably more information about government intervention in 
agriculture  than we  learn from  tariffs  (which  are  relatively  unimportant  in 
agriculture) or simple nominal protection coefficients  (which  capture only the 
effects  of  border  measures).  At  the  same  time,  negotiators  would  need 
something simpler than the detailed models used for  much economic analysis 
of policy effects. 
Extensive  work  at  the  Organization  for  Economic  Cooperation  and 
IThis overview was prepared by Nicole Ballenger, Praveen Dixit,  Bill Miner, Ed Rossmiller,  and Jerry 
Sharples.  It draws on background papers and input provided by Don McClatchy, Tom Hertel and 
Marinos Tsigas,  Nicole Ballenger and Stephanie Mercier, Louis Mahe and Herve Guyomard, Fabrizio De 
Filippis and Luca  Salvatic~ Martin Johnson, Louis Mahe and Terry Roe,  and Tim Josling.  The 
contributors are participants in an lATRC task force on "Support Reductions and Credits for Policy 
Actions."  The collection of background papers will be available as a Trade Consortium working paper. 2 
Development  (OEeD)  on the producer  subsidy  equivalent  (PSE)  encouraged 
negotiators to fmd a formal role in the negotiations for an aggregate index of 
this  type.  Subsequent  criticisms  of  the  PSE,  as  we  know  it,  produced 
suggestions that there might be an alternative AMS more suitable to be cast as 
an instrument of negotiation.  As  the Round has progressed, there has been 
considerable agreement over the need for some AMS  (the majority of proposals 
have alluded to one), but relatively little agreement over what its explicit role 
or key characteristics should be. 
The use of an AMS  as a negotiating device suggests a package approach 
to policy reform or at least some aspects of policy reform.  By  this we mean 
that  negotiators  would  be  concerned  with  moderating the  net  effects  of a 
particular policy regime (as indicated by all the policy components of the AMS), 
rather than with curtailing the use of any individual policy per se.  This would 
be a marked addition to past approaches such as "request and offer" (R&O)  and 
writing rules regulating the use of particular policy instruments (rules). 
The AMS  approach offers the possibility of broad-based, across-the-board 
reform that avoids the special interest group domination of the R&O  process, 
and allows  negotiators to focus  on the big picture rather than on  the policy 
details (that in the past have swamped the rules approach).  At the same time, 
the AMS  approach offers countries flexibility in their options for meeting their 
policy reform obligations.  However, the flexibility offered by the AMS approach, 
in  the  minds  of  some  negotiators  and  observers,  presents  problems:  a) 
particularly egregious policy instruments may remain in place,  and b)  "policy 
switching" could, in theory, produce greater trade disruptions than we currently 
face.  As several of our examples make clear, two equal AMS's can be associated 
with very different trade effects unless a methodology is devised to correct for 
these differences.  Furthermore, the commodity/country matrix to which the 
AMS approach might be applied may well be rather limited (for methodological, 
data, or institutional reasons). 
What are the possible roles for an AMS? 
An AMS  could perform any of four  functions.  It could be used to  (1) 
monitor levels  of support,  (2)  assess credit for  past policy  actions,  (3)  trigger 
corrective  actions or review procedures, or (4)  take on the role of a  bindable 
instrument of negotiation. 
Monitoring is at one end of the spectrum of possible uses.  Monitoring 
means that an AMS  is  used to  keep track of countries' progress  during the 
policy reform process.  Monitoring with an AMS may be one means of checking 
to  see that countries are meeting specific  commitments that may have been 
made via whatever negotiating framework is eventually chosen.  Or, monitoring 
might  be  done  merely  to  keep  watch  on  the  agricultural  policy  picture  in 
relation to trends and events in world markets.  If  commitments are accepted 
in terms of certain specific  policy  actions  (e.g.,  the gradual elimination of an 3 
administered price program), monitoring with an AMS  might be needed only 
during a phase-in period.  Other specific commitments (e.g.,  full  conversion of 
a  quota to tariff)  might not call for  a  monitoring device.  Still others (e.g.,  a 
long-term commitment to  make  domestic policies  responsive  to international 
market conditions) might require long-term monitoring. 
At the opposite  end of the spectrum of possible roles is the AMS  as a 
legally-bound instrument of negotiation.  For this purpose, the AMS  takes the 
part  of a  tariff schedule  for  agriculture.  With  no  additional  restrictions  on 
policy  instruments, such  a  role  would  give  countries considerable  latitude in 
choosing  the  path  to  lower  support  levels.  Accompanying  rules  could  be 
necessary  to  ensure  that AMS  reductions  coincide  with  reductions  in  trade 
distortions.  Also,  the level of aggregation of the AMS  must be decided.  Are 
commitments  negotiated  on  a  commodity-by-commodity  basis,  or  across  the 
board?  (Actual tariff schedules contain much more commodity disaggregation 
than is  currently reflected in calculations of AMS's.  In an AMS,  beef is beef 
regardless of how it is packaged or sliced.)  Further, negotiators would have to 
decide if commitments are to be made in terms of percent reductions in the 
AMS,  value  reductions,  or target levels  to  be  reached over  some  negotiated 
period of time. 
Intermediate roles include the AMS as a "triggering" or "crediting" device. 
Triggering suggests a more formal role for the AMS  in the monitoring process. 
In  other  words,  parties  might  agree  (or  be  legally  bound)  to  take  some 
corrective  or  consultative  action  signalled by a  predesignated change  in the 
AMS.  PSE's  are  used  in  this  manner  in  the  U.S.-Canada  Free  Trade 
Agreement. 
Measurement  of "credits"  or  "debits"  extended  to  countries  for  policy 
changes made since the negotiations began or since some negotiated base period 
would be a likely use for the AMS.  The mid-term review agreement endorses 
the concept of giving credit for positive policy  changes implemented since the 
Round began, implying the need for some means of quantifying such changes. 
The  above  roles  need  not  be  mutually  exclusive.  For  example,  a 
comprehensive AMS (one including the broadest possible policy set) might be an 
informal monitoring device;  while a more carefully limited AMS  (one including 
only policies agreed to be trade distorting) might be bound.  Similarly,  credit 
might  be  given  for  only  certain  policy  changes  (agreed  upon  through 
negotiation), thus calling for  only a partial AMS  to be used for this particular 
purpose.  The most recent U.S.  proposal appears to assign the AMS  a  formal 
role only in "disciplining" (where it's not clear whether this means monitoring 
or  binding)  the use  of a  limited set of domestic  policies  designated  neither 
strictly acceptable or unacceptable. 4 
What are the alternative forms of the AMS? 
Three alternative forms of the AMS  have been proposed in the context 
of the current agricultural negotiations.  The most familiar is the measure used 
in  the  OECD's  trade  mandate  study:  the  PSE.  The  PSE  represents  the 
payment  that  would  be  required  to  compensate  producers  of  a  particular 
commodity for the loss of income resulting from the removal of a given package 
of policy measures.
2  In other words, the PSE is an estimate of how much of 
a  cash subsidy--paid in place of current policies--would result in current levels 
of producer income.  It is typically  expressed in one or more of three ways, 
although  other  expressions  are  possible:  1)  the  total  value  of  assistance 
associated  with  the  production  of  a  particular  crop,  2)  the  total  value  of 
assistance per unit of production of the commodity, and 3) the total value of 
assistance as a  percentage of the adjusted value of output of the commodity, 
where  the  adjusted  value  includes  any  net  direct  payments  from  the 
government to the producer (percent PSE). 
PSE calculations typically rely on budget data and prices (ERS).  Budget· 
data are used to estimate the subsidy equivalent of many types of transfers 
from  taxpayers  to  producers,  such  as  deficiency  payments,  input  subsidies, 
marketing assistance, research, and extension programs.  Price data are typically 
needed to  estimate transfers from  consumers to producers,  such  as through 
price  support  programs  and  border  measures.  These  latter  transfers  are 
manifested  as  gaps  between  internal  (or  producer)  prices  and  external  (or 
reference) prices.  The dependence of PSE's--and other AMS's--on these price 
wedges underlies much of the discussion of reference price issues found below. 
As  a  price-based indicator, the familiar percent PSE is criticized by the 
authors  of  some  of  our  examples  for  being  not  very  useful  when  policy 
instruments are both prices and quantities.  For example, when supply controls 
are coupled with price or income support programs, the percent PSE captures 
the price and income enhancement effects of the program (through the price 
wedge) but not the income losses associated with restraints on production.  In 
such cases it is possible for the measured income transfer to be quite large at 
the same time that the effect of the programs on production and, consequently, 
trade is much smaller. 
The other two measures are basically variations of the PSE as we know 
it in the context of the OECD work.  The trade distortion equivalent (TDE), as 
2The PSE has a sister measure called the consumer subsidy equivalent (CSE).  The eSE is  defrned as 
the cash subsidy that would maintain current levels of consumer expenditure on a particular commodity 
in the absence of agriculture and food programs directly affecting consumption.  In industrial market 
economies CSE's usually indicate that agricultural programs tax consumers, that is,  they are negative. 
This paper doesn't discuss eSE's because the focus,  for negotiating purposes, has been on the PSE. 
Nonetheless, the CSE's can provide useful insight into the trade effects associated with PSE's. 5 
defined by the Canadian proposal, is basically a PSE applied only to those policy 
measures  agreed  to  be  significantly  trade  distorting  (GATT,  1987).  Policy 
measures such  as research,  extension,  education,  infrastructure development, 
and some marketing regulations are often mentioned as candidates for exclusion 
from the TDE and, possibly, from negotiation altogether.  The Canadian position 
is that an AMS should also reflect distortion-reducing aspects of supply controls 
used in conjunction with supply-inducing measures.  A number of our examples 
amplify these points. 
The support measurement unit (SMU) , as defined by the EC proposal, 
would further modify the PSE to, again, focus on policies that significantly affect 
farmers'  production  decisions  and to  take into  account  the effects  of supply 
control measures, but also to remove the effects of fluctuations in world price 
and currency values (GATT, July 1989).  Thus, the SMU would be smaller than 
the  PSE  when  the  supply-increasing  or  trade-distorting  effects  of  support 
policies  are  offset  wholly  or  partly  by  supply  controls.  In  addition,  its 
calculation would be based on world reference prices (and/or their corresponding 
exchange rates) frozen at levels observed in an agreed upon base year or multi-
year period.  The use of a sliding average for  the base, or periodic updates of 
the base, would also be considered. 
An important point is that these three measures are not totally different 
concepts.  Each  relies  on  the  notion  that  there  is  a  subsidy  equivalent 
associated  with  each  policy  instrument;  and each  measure  aggregates  these 
subsidy equivalent components to a total level of support.  They each rely on 
many of the same calculation techniques.  Nonetheless,  each measure tells a 
somewhat different story about the effects of government intervention.  In some 
instances,  the  three  alternatives  can  yield  quite  different  sums  and  are, 
therefore, a matter for  negotiation.  As  suggested in the "roles" section above, 
defining the particular use of the measure could help negotiators decide among 
them. 
Assessing credit should be a  simple matter, or is it? 
The  language  of the  mid-term  review  agreement  suggests  that,  at  a 
minimum, a measurement tool is needed to assess credit for policy actions taken 
since the inception of the Uruguay Round.  The EC originally pushed to take 
into account  such  actions--arguing that its own  actions taken since  1986  had 
reduced the trade-distorting effects of its Common Agricultural Policy--and the 
concept,  at least, appears to have been formally  adopted.  The notion is that 
when a GATT agreement on the reduction of trade-distorting support (or on the 
trade-distortion  effects  of  support)  is  reached,  credit  for  past  actions  will 
somehow be applied against the commitments embodied in the agreement.  The 
April  1989  GATT  agreement specifies  that credit will  be granted for  actions 
taken since 1986.  But many issues related to assessing credit remain unclear. 
If  credit is to be measured, the detmition of 1986 must be clarified.  In 6 
other words,  what is the date from  which  credit will be given:  for  example, 
should support levels  at the time of an agreement be compared with those 
observed during the 1986/87 crop  year, the 1986  calendar year,  or the 1986 
fiscal year?  What if reference prices or exchange rates were somehow unusual 
or atypical in that base period?  Should appropriate adjustments be made, and 
how?  Two  base periods may well  have to be decided upon for  determining 
credits:  1)  the  starting  point  against  which  subsequent  policy  actions  are 
measured, and 2)  the base which fixes the world market environment against 
which any policy actions, past or future, are judged. 
On the basis of the April accord,  credit is to be given for policy actions 
which make a positive contribution to long-term agricultural reform.  There is 
general agreement on the broad objectives of long term reform (GATT,  1986; 
GATT,  1989),  but these objectives  do  not describe  specific  policy  actions  for 
which  credit  should  be  granted.  Thus,  before  credits  can  be  measured, 
negotiating parties must decide which past policy actions qualify for credit.  This 
may well  be the same negotiations which  must occur  in order to  determine 
which policies are trade distorting and which should be reduced or removed in 
the future! 
To  qualify  for  credit,  should  a  policy  action  represent  a  basic  policy 
change  that  cannot  be  reversed  through  administrative  action,  budget 
adjustments, or other means?  The answer to this question may well depend on 
the negotiating framework.  If  commitments are made based on an AMS, it may 
be the overall level of the AMS  used that is bound rather than specific policy 
actions.  If  commitments are made on specific policy actions,  those for  which 
credit is given would, presumably, be bound in the final agreement. 
In sum, issues related to credit are very similar to those which must be faced 
in reaching a general agricultural agreement. 
Is there a measuring device  available which will adequately capture the 
effects of policy changes for which credit will be granted?  The EC, for example, 
would like credit for  recently implemented supply control schemes.  The EC's 
SMU would build in credit for supply controls, but the methodology for  doing 
so has not yet been revealed.  Supply controls in the context of an AMS  is the 
subject of several of our examples discussed below. 
Finally,  some  policy  actions  taken  since  1986  may  have  contributed 
negatively to the reform program.  No  mention of assigning debits appears in 
the  mid-term  agreement,  but presumably  countries  having  increased  trade-
distorting support  since  the Round began would  be expected to make larger 
steps  toward  reform  than  those  receiving  credit.  The  issues  related  to 
identifying and measuring debits parallel crediting issues with maybe an added 
twist: should countries be debited for having taken countervailing actions since 
1986? 7 
What can we learn from a  simple, numerical example of an AMS? 
When discussing an AMS it may help to take a look at a simple example. 
This example can then be used to illustrate some of the issues alluded to above 
and examined in somewhat more detail below. 
Consider  the  following  example  of  one  type  of AMS  for  a  specific 
commodity such as wheat: 
PSE  =  M  +  D  +  0 
Expressed as percent: 
PSE%  = «M +  D  + 0) \  ( P  w  +  D  +  M»  * 100 
where: PSE is the per unit producer subsidy equivalent, 
M is a per unit subsidy generated by border measures such as tariffs or 
quotas, that  drive a wedge between domestic and world price, 
D is per unit direct payment to producers, 
o is per unit non-production subsidies for  inputs, marketing, etc, 
P  w is the world or external reference price. 
A simple example illustrates how an AMS  such as the PSE shown above 
might be used to monitor or give credit for policy actions taken in a given year. 
For  simplicity,  let  us  assume  that  our  sample  country  provides  support  to 
producers through an agency that purchases all domestically grown grain at an 
administered price P s  and sells that grain on the world market at the world 
market price Pw'  Assume no marketing margin.  Then the difference between 
Ps and Pw equals  (M).  In this example  there are no  direct payments (D)  or 
other subsidies (0). 
Consider now a case where our sample country reduces its administered 
purchase price of grain from  $50  in year 1 to $48  in year 2  in order to get 
domestic prices more in line with world prices.  It would like GATT rules to be 
such  that  it  would  receive  credit  for  that  liberalizing  action.  Data  and 
computations are as follows: 
This example  shows that in year 2  the world price  increased $4 and the 
subsidy per unit decreased $6.00  (column 2).  Part of the decrease was due to a 8 
decrease in price support policies as shown in the $2.00 reduction in Ps'  and part 
of the decrease ($4.00) was due to a rise in the world price.  Thus using the simple 
formula given above, the percent PSE fell from 20 percent in year 1 to 8 percent 
in year 2. 
Should  this  country  get  "credit"  for  policy  changes  as  measured  by  the 
reduction of the PSE from  20  to 8  percent?  This question raises  a  number of 
conceptual issues associated with measuring and monitoring policy changes with an 
AMS. 
Should changes in market conditions be omitted? 
Over time an AMS for a given commodity can change due to (a) a change in 
policy,  or (b) a  change in market conditions.  It could be argued that the "credit" 
issue  only  relates to  changes in policy  and so  the AMS  should be restricted to 
measuring the effects of (a).  But separating (a) from (b) is difficult.  For example, 
government  support  of  agriculture  in  the  United  States  and  the  European 
Community dropped in 1988 relative to 1987.  Although there were some policy 
changes, the main reason for the decrease was the rise in world market prices for 
grain.  Support policies in the US  and EC are designed to automatically reduce 
support when prices rise, and increase support when prices fall.  Separating out the 
drop in support due only to the basic policy changes would be difficult and likely 
quite arbitrary. 
It  may not be important to separate the two.  Governments could decide that 
over a  specified period of time support levels need to be reduced to a  specified 
level,  no  matter what happens to year-to-year world market conditions.  In the 
above  example,  the  PSE  value  of  8  for  year  2  captures  changes  in  market 
conditions as well as changes in policy. 
If, however, country negotiators in GATT agree that it is important to separate (a) 
from (b), then one must define a base period set of market conditions that can be 
held constant over time so that any change in the AMS  is entirely due to changes 
in policy. 
For example, assume for our simple example that negotiators decide to define 
the world or external reference price in year 1 as the base price for calculating the 
year 2 PSE (see data for year 2').  Then a calculated M -- the difference between 
the price  support of $48  and the base  (year  1)  world  price  of $40  --is  used to 
calculate the PSE for year 2,  rather than an observed M.  The calculated percent 
PSE is 17  for year 2 rather than 8 (year 2', above).  Under these conditions, the 
PSE declines from 20 percent in year 1 to 17 percent in year 2, implying much less 
"credit"  should  be  given  for  the  policy  action  than  implied  by  the  previous 
computation.  Is this a better representation of the "credit" that should be granted 
this country for  changes in policies?  If so,  then this introduces major questions 
of how to define market or "reference" prices. 9 
What reference price should be used? 
Closely  related to the above  discussion  is the selection of the appropriate 
reference prices (P  w and P  s)  to use in the calculation of any AMS.  Should those 
prices in the AMS  equation be the observed world prices, prices from a specified 
year, an average of several years, a moving average,  ... ?  One option would be to use 
observed reference prices for  the year under consideration, as shown for the first 
calculation of the PSE for year 2,  above.  AMS's based on actual reference prices 
would,  however,  include  influences  of factors  beyond  the  control  of  domestic 
agricultural  policy  measures,  for  instance,  those  generated  by  fluctuations  in 
international prices and exchange rates.  Hence, a decrease in external price or an 
appreciation of the home currency could cause an increase in support to producers 
without any changes in domestic policy. 
Should such external influences be included or excluded from the definition 
of AMS's?  If one of the goals  of trade liberalization is to make domestic policy 
more responsive to international market conditions, then the use of actual reference 
prices  appears  reasonable.  However,  in  order  for  a  country  to  stay  within 
negotiated AMS  upper limits, such a scheme could require continual adjustments 
in domestic  prices in response  to  changes in market conditions.  The problems 
associated with this alternative could be numerous.  Should a fixed reference price 
which  is  kept  constant  in  the  domestic  currency  of the  country  concerned  be 
adopted to alleviate this problem?  AMS's based on fixed  reference prices would 
highlight changes in domestic policy but would also insulate domestic markets from 
world market conditions.  Is this consistent with the market-oriented goals of trade 
liberalization established for  the Uruguay Round? 
How about a moving average of reference prices that smooths out exchange 
rate and market fluctuations?  This option would allow  domestic prices at least 
some responsiveness to international prices and exchange rates.  But, how many 
years does one include in such a scheme?  Does one use a large number of years 
such that the average would tend to be stable, or do  we only take into account a 
limited number of recent years? 
Can there be a middle ground?  Could AMS's be calculated using an external 
price that is fixed for a given period of time, and then recalculated based on new 
external prices for  another period of time?  Such a  process could conceivably be 
sustained until the targeted reductions in AMS's are achieved. 
Is there an ideal base period? 
The issue of ''base period" is separate from the issue of the date from which 
policy changes will be monitored and credit will be given.  The base period defines 
a set of market conditions that will be used in the computation of an AMS  which, 
in turn, is used to monitor policy changes.  That period can be one selected year 
or an average of several years. 
The choice of a base or reference period is important because it dermes the levels 10 
of policy interventions that are initially permissible.  For example, a base period 
with very low market prices would likely lead to calculations of high AMS's for the 
initial period.  High initial AMS's  could be advantageous to countries who prefer 
to protect and support agriculture.  High AMS's  allow countries greater latitude 
in negotiations, especially if the aggregate measures are to be used as the basis on 
which binding commitments are made.  But, what are the chances that anyone 
period would be mutually agreeable to all parties?  Aggregate AMS's are likely to 
peak in different years for  different countries.  Moreover, the likelihood that any 
one period is advantageous to all commodity sectors even within countries is small. 
Calculations made by the OECD  for  the EC and the United States indicate that 
PSE's peak in different years for  different commodities. 
How  do  we  resolve  these  issues?  One  solution  may be  to  formulate  a 
"representative" base year that is an average of a number of years rather than a 
fIxed year.  Such an average could smooth out wide annual fluctuations in policy 
interventions.  For example, an average of annual data for 1984 through 1986 could 
capture years of high and low intervention, commodity stock build-ups and declines, 
and other such unusual variations.  But even here, can there be an agreement on 
the years to be included in the base period? 
Should equilibrium prices and exchange rates be used? 
Just identifying the nature of reference prices does not solve  all problems 
regarding the reference prices.  There are at least three additional  issues that 
concern the choice of reference price P  w. 
First, would AMS's based on existing international market prices be biased 
against those countries that distort trade only minimally?  The argument is that 
a country's AMS  may look large not because it has high levels of domestic support 
but because other countries, most notably the United States and the EC,  pursue 
policies that depress international prices.  Should AMS's,  therefore, be based on 
estimated world market equilibrium prices derived from a  non-distorted market? 
If  so,  where do  we get such prices? 
Second,  if fIxed  reference prices were chosen,  how do  we  determine what 
exchange rates to use to translate external prices into domestic currency?  Do  we 
use an actual exchange rate prevailing at the time, or do  we establish some sort 
of a "shadow" rate?  This could be especially important to developing countries that 
tend to have misaligned exchange rates. 
Third,  could there be difficulties  in picking the actual reference prices to 
calculate  the AMS's?  Substantial differences  could exist in the reference prices 
used to calculate the price gaps for  different countries' PSE's because of quality 
differences,  transportation margins, and processing costs.  Would AMS  reductions 
under such conditions favor one country or another depending upon the reduction 
approach pursued? 11 
Should changes in production make a  difference? 
Should  a  country  receive  credit  for  changes  in  agricultural  support  as 
measured by per unit of production or by its total impact?  This is an issue for 
commodities experiencing either substantial year-to-year production variability or 
a strong trend in production -- either up or down. 
In our example, the PSE is expressed as a per-unit measure.  A derivative 
measure  of total  support  (T)  would  be:  T  =  PSE * Q,  where  Q  is  quantity 
produced.  Suppose in the above example that production was 10,000 units in year 
1 and 26,000 units in year 2.  The computed value of T would be $100,000 in year 
1 (10,000 * $10) and $104,000 in year 2 (26,000 * $4).  If  T were used to measure 
support, our example country would receive negative credit in year 2 because the 
value of T  went up. 
What should be included in the AMS? 
The PSE, as dermed by the OEeD and the Economic Research Service (ERS), 
is  primarily  a  measure  of policy-generated  support  for  producers'  (and  input 
suppliers' and marketers') income.  There are problems with using this AMS  to 
measure and monitor changes in agricultural policy.  Likely  of more interest to 
GATT negotiators would be an AMS that only measured policy-generated distortions 
of a country's trade of agricultural commodities. 
Should  the  AMS,  therefore,  only  measure  various  forms  of direct  support  for 
production  of agricultural commodities,  or should it also  include  other forms  of 
government intervention that distort trade?  Examples of "other forms" of subsidies 
are those along the marketing chain beyond the farm gate, such as transportation 
and port facility  subsidies.  One might want to differentiate between marketing 
subsidies that are tied to specific quantities going through the marketing chain, and 
infrastructure subsidies for constructing and maintaining the facilities.  The former 
might be considered more trade distorting than the latter. 
Similarly, should the AMS be limited to measuring changes in direct producer 
support or should it also  measure changes in support for  structural adjustment? 
Should subsidization of structural adjustment of the farm sector be considered the 
same as production support?  Trading partners likely would want to encourage true 
long-run structural adjustment at home and abroad.  If so, government expenditures 
to facilitate structural adjustment should not be in the AMS.  Similar arguments 
could  be made for  omitting producer taxes  or subsidies put in place  to achieve 
environmental objectives.  On the other hand, the more policies that are omitted 
from the calculus of the AMS,  the more opportunities there are to enact policies 
to escape the discipline of a reduced AMS. 
Should the AMS  be able to distinguish between coupled and decoupled (or 
less coupled) support of production?  Decoupled support, by definition, would be less 
trade distorting per dollar of government expenditure.  Thus it would appear than 12 
an AMS should reflect the degree to which support was coupled.  But adjusting the 
AMS  to accurately reflect the degree  of decoupling  would  be very difficult,  and 
likely appear somewhat arbitrary. 
Should the AMS  include credit for production control?  It would be possible 
to have a production control program that just offsets the supply-distorting effects 
of production supports.  The net effect of the two policy instruments would be no 
trade  distortion.  An AMS  that ignored production  control  would  overstate the 
degree of production and trade distortion of the combined impact of the two policy 
instruments.  Including  production  in  the  AMS  raises  two  problems.  First, 
measuring production  control  in  AMS  units  would  be  very  difficult.  It would 
require--as  our real-world  examples  will  portray--measures  of shadow  prices  or 
supply elasticities.  Getting multilateral agreement on a method of measurement 
likely would be even more difficult.  Second,  there is the conceptual issue of to 
what extent the AMS should measure the degree of market intervention.  A grains 
policy that offset production subsidies with production control might yield a  low 
AMS value, but it would not be a policy that reflected reduced market intervention. 
Should  the  AMS  include  longer  run  subsidies  such  as  public  support  of 
research  or  support  for  marketing  infrastructure  -- e.g.,  construction  of 
transportation and port facilities?  Can such subsidies be considered trade distorting 
in the long run? 
Is there an ideal AMS? 
The choice of AMS  depends on the use to which it is put.  If  the interest is 
the total level  of government support to agriculture,  regardless  of its effect  on 
trade, the measure of choice is likely to be the PSE.  If  users are more interested 
in the  level  of trade-distorting  support,  they  will fmd  the  TDE  concept  more 
appealing.  If users want to isolate the effects of policy changes from world market 
changes, they will want to investigate the use of the SMU. 
The AMS's  explicit role in the negotiations will influence the choice.  The 
PSE, TDE, or SMU could be acceptable choices for a monitoring device, depending 
on the purpose of monitoring.  Some would argue for  the PSE on the basis that 
the more information we have about the policy environment and its relation to the 
market environment the better, and PSE's contain more information of this sort 
than TDE's or SMU's.  For triggering,  crediting,  or binding,  negotiating parties 
might be expected to prefer the more narrowly focused TDE, which would isolate 
their nondistorting policies from international discipline, or the SMU, which would 
absolve them of responsibility for world market changes beyond their control.  We 
would expect that as a bindable instrument of negotiation the SMU would generate 
the most support. 
But even if there is general agreement that the TDE or SMU  is preferred as a 
formal negotiating device to the PSE, many of the same issues crop up:  What is 
a trade-distorting subsidy?  How would we quantify credit for production restraints? 13 
How do  we determine the reference price and the base period?  These issues are 
returned to again and again in the examples that follow. 
The AMS and Supply Controls 
Our first example looks at problems in using the AMS as a measure of trade-
distortions  (or  as  an  indicator  of reductions  in trade  distortions  due  to  policy 
changes) when supply controls are present.  With a simple graphical example, Don 
McClatchy makes the point that it is possible to have a  high measured PSE and 
little  or  no  production,  consumption,  or  trade  distortion.  This  is  because,  as 
suggested above, supply controls can significantly reduce the level of production and 
trade distortion which would otherwise occur if  the effects of the price or income 
support program were not constrained.  McClatchy argues that, in principle, AMS 
reduction obligations should be proportional to the level of production distortion 
generated by the support package. 
McClatchy demonstrates that relatively straightforward, pragmatic approaches 
do  exist to determine "approximately" the effect of supply controls on reducing the 
level of production distortion.  Once this effect has been ascertained, credit for the 
distortion-reducing  effects  of supply  controls  could  be  granted  in  the  form  of 
downward adjustments in AMS reduction commitments.  What McClatchy has done, 
essentially, is to suggest an adjustment factor that could be used in the conversion 
of PSE's to TDE's.  It's a  simple  concept,  but it does  rely on negotiations over 
what countries' production would have been in the absence of the supply controls. 
A second example, from Tom Hertel and Marinos Tsigas, looks explicitly at 
alternative types of supply controls used in U.S.  agriculture and asks if they all 
have the same effect on trade.  In other words, if  you've seen one supply control 
program, have you seen them all?  Hertel and Tsigas argue that alternative forms 
of supply control affect productive capacity and trade differently.  They warn that 
supply controls may not provide the incentives necessary to move  resources into 
alternative uses and, as a consequence, may only temporarily curtail supply.  U.S. 
acreage  controls,  for  example,  have  historically  tended  to  increase  productive 
capacity by promoting higher-yield agriculture; but U.S. output quota schemes (e.g., 
that now used in the tobacco program) tend to reduce productive capacity (provided 
the quotas are tradeable)  because they encourage lower-input agriculture  and a 
slower rate of growth in yields.  Domestic marketing quotas (used, for example, in 
the U.S. peanut program) are the most trade-distorting form of supply control they 
consider.  Such  programs  encourage  surplus  disposal  because  sales  to  export 
markets are not restricted.  The main message is that negotiators must be very 
careful to fully understand the implications of any particular supply control program 
before  granting  credit  for  it.  Another  message  is  that,  even if supply-control 
adjustment factors are derived, AMS's are still likely to tell incomplete stories about 
the effects of policy reform on the movement of agricultural resources into more 
productive uses. 
Freezing Program Yields 14 
Hertel and Tsigas go  on,  in example three, to discuss  a  key aspect of the 
U.S.  wheat program:  the freezing  of program yields.  This  U.S.  policy  change, 
implemented after 1985, began the process of "decoupling" deficiency payments from 
farm production decisions because farmers no longer have the incentive to increase 
yields in order to qualify for  higher payments.  In fact,  Hertel and Tsigas argue 
that  the  freeze  on  yields  reduces  input  use  by  program  participants,  thereby 
lowering output and export levels.  They conclude that an AMS  which counts all 
deficiency payments would be misleading as a  trade distortion index,  and that a 
TDE or SMU should be accordingly adjusted in order to credit the United States 
for  having frozen program yields.  They warn, however, that the permanency of 
this policy action is still uncertain and that if credit is to be given it should be 
accompanied by a bound commitment to the freeze. 
The Export Enhancement Program and the PSE 
In  example  four,  Nicole  Ballenger  and  Stephanie  Mercier  consider  a 
contentious policy instrument--the U.S. export enhancement program (EEP)--in the 
context  of  an  AMS.  They  use  this  example  to  demonstrate  the  lack  of 
independence among the numerous components of the U.S.  PSE.  For example, 
when the EEP is changed it affects U.S.  deficiency payments, storage payments, 
and  CCC  loan  forfeitures  through  its effect  on  market prices.  This  makes it 
difficult to isolate the effect of any particular policy change and,  for  example, to 
measure with precision the credit (or debit) associated with the EEP. 
Ballenger and Mercier also point to problems with the fIXed  reference price, 
or SMU, approach in the presence of the EEP.  The EEP lacks established program 
provisions, aside from occasional budget caps.  The subsidy equivalent calculation 
for  the EEP relies on  knowing the ex post subsidy rate.  But this subsidy rate 
appears to depend, in some way,  on U.S.  export prices.  If  reference prices are to 
be fixed, then some rule relating the EEP subsidy rate to the reference price must 
be devised in order to calculate the EEP component of the AMS.  In other words, 
unlike the case demonstrated does not rely on an administered price.  There may 
not be  many programs  like  the  EEP  with  its wandering parameters,  but this 
particular one would be likely to be important in the credit discussion. 
Supply Controls as Decoupled Transfers 
In example five, Louis Mahe and Herve Guyomard take on the supply control 
problem from a somewhat different perspective than McClatchy.  Like McClatchy, 
they argue that when policy  instruments are both quantities and prices,  rather 
than prices only, the familiar PSE is not very useful for measuring credits.  They 
show that when production quotas are in place, the total income transfer, or PSE, 
can be decomposed into a  "decoupled transfer" and a  "supply-distorting transfer". 
As its name suggest, the supply-distorting transfer is the part which is responsible 
for supply increases above free trade levels.  It is this part that must be measured 
in  order  to  credit  countries  for  reform  of these  types  of programs.  Unlike 15 
McClatchy,  these authors would  rely on calculations  of shadow prices associated 
with the quota rights rather than on estimates of what production would have been 
in the absence  of the quota.  If a  market for  quota rights exists,  these shadow 
prices might be observed; otherwise, they must be estimated with economic models. 
The authors estimate credits for EC policy measures taken between 1986 and 1988. 
EC Supply Controls versus Financial Stabilizers in the PSE 
Fabrizio De Filippis and Luca Salvatici continue the above theme in example 
six.  They discuss key EC policy changes, including supply control measures such 
as  quotas  for  dairy  and  sugar,  and  optional  set-aside,  extensification  and  pre-
retirement,  and budget  measures  such  as  co-responsibility  levies  and  financial 
stabilizers.  The effects  of these  measures  show  up  differently  in the PSE  as 
currently calculated, and the authors argue that the PSE is more sensitive to the 
effects of the financial stabilizers than to those of quotas. 
De Filippis and Salvatici show that the effects of production quotas are not 
captured in the EC's percent PSE.  However, if only the numerator of the PSE 
(that is,  the total PSE) is used, the quota effects do  register.  Noting that total 
PSE's are not good bases for  comparisons across countries, the authors return to 
the notion that percent PSE's might be adjusted to account for distortion-reducing 
effects of supply controls with methods like those suggested by our other authors. 
PSE's  are  much  better,  these  authors show,  at  crediting the  EC  for  its 
fmancial stabilizers--programs that reduce the price paid to farmers and impose co-
responsibility levies when predesignated production quantities are overshot--than 
for its production controls.  They also conclude, using estimates of changes in the 
total PSE for cereals, that the EC set-aside program does little, at least currently, 
to control EC oversupply. 
In sum, what have we learned? 
In concept, the AMS approach would seem to simplify the negotiating process 
by  allowing  negotiators  to  focus  on  a  single  aggregate  indicator  and avoid  the 
morass  of specific  policy  instruments.  However,  many  complex  problems  are 
associated with the use of an AMS.  As shown in several of our examples, it may 
be difficult  to ensure that an AMS  is defined in such  a  way that it accurately 
captures the intent of the negotiators.  Negotiators need to understand that in 
order for  an AMS  to accurately serve the purpose for which it was intended, key 
concepts and methods for  computation would need to be spelled out and agreed 
upon by all parties.  Key  issues include:  What policies might be excluded from 
negotiation  and,  therefore,  from  the  AMS?  Should  changes  in  the  market 
environment (i.e.,  world prices and exchange rates) be excluded from the AMS  or 
held constant?  If  market conditions are held constant, what reference prices--for 
what base period--should be used?  How should production controls be measured 
and incorporated in the negotiating framework?  What kinds  of rules would be 16 
needed to accompany the AMS  approach? 
These questions are really both political and technical.  If negotiators can 
agree  on  what they want the AMS  to do,  technical solutions  can be left  up to 
technical staffs; but even the technical solutions will generate considerable debate. 
Measurement  of supply  controls,  for  example,  depends  on  underlying  economic 
parameters such  as  supply  elasticities.  Are  these readily  available  and widely 
accepted?  If not,  can credit for  such  actions be arrived at through negotiation 
rather than through a precise technical exercise?  Political will may well underlie 
the success of such efforts. 
A solution to the reference price problem might not be terribly elusive.  One 
position is that countries cannot be held accountable for AMS  changes that stem 
from  exogenous  changes  in world  market conditions.  The  other is  that policy 
changes should reflect changes in the market environment--that this is what the 
Round is all about.  Maybe the compromise lies in initially 
fIxing the reference price--with relatively little thought given to whether the period 
chosen is ideal--and then updating the reference price every couple of years.  Initial 
commitments would be based on the fIxed reference price PSE (SMU), but ex ante 
PSE's  would  be  calculated  periodically  to  indicate  whether  the  situation  had 
changed enough to warrant a review of the reference prices and, thereby, countries' 
commitments.  The more formal  the role for  the AMS,  the more necessary the 
resolution of this issue. 
Resolving the reference price (or SMU v.  PSE) issue might be easier than 
striking a  substantive agricultural agreement without the help of an AMS.  The 
problems with the traditional negotiating framework are emphasized in a paper by 
Martin Johnson, Louis Mahe and Terry Roe  which looks at the political economy 
of policy reform in the United States and the EC.  These authors fInd that in the 
absence  of compensatory  payments,  mutually  advantageous  agreement  between 
these two parties seems to exist only for marginal changes in agricultural policies. 
The possibility of obtaining GATT agreement on more substantial reform is greatly 
increased, they contend, if budget savings are used to compensate the politically 
powerful losers.  Their results suggest that AMS's, at a very minimum, constitute 
a  crucial information base.  They can help negotiators identify gainers and losers 
from  liberalization  and  the  relative  gains  and  losses,  information  critical  to 
compensatory  schemes  and  negotiation  strategies.  But,  maybe  even  more 
importantly,  their  results  underscore  the  difficulty  of  the  request  and  offer 
approach,  and  lead  us  to  ask  once  again if the  AMS  might  be  the  key  to  a 
successful Uruguay Round. 17 
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